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ABSTRACT: Human beings can only experience a thin ribbon of reality constrained by the biological limits of 
our perceptual systems. Yet, science routinely examines processes and phenomenon outside of human scale and 
science-related policy requires us to use our conceptions of these toward informed policy making. It often falls to 
experts to assist non-experts in constructing conceptions beyond human scale. This paper will organize relevant 
literature from varied fields to introduce the cognitive challenge of comprehending concepts beyond human scale 
and to suggest what communication techniques experts may find useful to help non-experts arrive at a perception 
more closely aligned with reality. 
KEYWORDS: construal theory, grounded cognition, narrative, numeracy, psychology, psychophysics, risk 
communication, science communication, visual communication. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Human beings can only experience a thin ribbon of reality constrained by the biological limits 
of our perceptual systems. While we can conceive of varied timeframes, sizes and dimensions, 
we cannot perceive them directly. Our conceptions of reality beyond human scale are therefore 
dependent upon the language used to describe it and will be built on analogues from our direct 
experience, both of which make an accurate conception of such reality unlikely. 
 Science routinely examines processes and phenomenon outside of human scale and 
science-related policy routinely asks us to assess our likely inaccurate conceptions of these 
processes and phenomenon toward informed policy making. While experts have the same 
perceptual limits as all humans, they often have a much richer conception of such constructs 
due to their training and experience that enables them to identify patterns that are not 
perceivable by non-experts (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ross, 2006). Therefore, it often falls 
to experts to explain these processes and phenomenon toward assisting the construction of non-
expert perceptions. Since many political decisions depend on these non-expert perceptions, the 
expert communication of processes and phenomenon beyond human scale becomes crucial for 
informed decision making.  
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 To take an example, in 2010 the Deepwater Horizon oil spill expelled 4.9 million 
barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico (Restore the Gulf, 2010). To arrive at some 
conception of this magnitude, an individual must take something about which they have direct 
experience—something within human scale—and perceptually extrapolate to the desired 
magnitude outside of human scale. In this case, how does an individual extrapolate what they 
know about liquid volume, possibly thinking of a gallon of milk or the water-filled safety 
barrels surrounding highway onramps, to construct a perception of 4.9 million barrels? 
Whatever perception is formed will then determine the perceived severity of the event and 
opinions about what should be done. For some individuals, 4.9 million may be so meaningless 
that the risk is never cognitively engaged. To others, 4.9 million may fall within a categorically 
“large” conception similar to any other value considered “large,” even if the actual values 
differ by many factors of magnitude. Either perception would likely result in different 
“appropriate” responses, neither of which may necessarily approach the best action to address 
the actual magnitude of effect.  
 Therefore, the primary questions of interest become (1) how do individuals 
extrapolate information taken from their direct experience in an attempt to comprehend 
processes and phenomenon beyond human scale and (2) how can experts best use 
communication to either assist or counter this extrapolation to arrive at a perception more 
closely aligned with reality? Unfortunately, the cognitive challenges of perceiving beyond 
human scale remain understudied. No single research area examines these questions. Rather, 
multiple strands of tangential research occasionally intersect within this scope of inquiry. 
Therefore, this paper will not attempt to answer these questions, but rather to define the scope 
of the problem by organizing relevant literature from varied fields linking perceptual limits and 
psychological extrapolation and suggesting research into communication techniques that may 
assist experts in improving the accuracy of non-expert conceptions beyond human scale.  
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
2.1 Psychophysics 
The field of psychophysics examines the relationship between physical stimuli and the 
sensations they produce (Snook, 1999) and attempts to develop mathematical functions that 
describe these relationships. These functions allow the calculation of the amount of sensory 
input needed to register a certain psychological perception at a certain magnitude.  
 One of the most cited of these functions is Weber’s law, named after one of the 
founders of the discipline, Ernst Heinrich Weber. Weber’s law states that as the magnitude of 
sensory input increases, it takes a greater increase in sensory input to cause the same increase 
in perceptions of that sensory input (Solomon, 2009). For instance, it would be easier to notice 
a difference between objects weighing 10 and 20 pounds than a difference between objects 
weighing 110 and 120 pounds. The term “Just Noticeable Differences” are used to describe 
such a unit change in perception (Bartoshuk, 2004; Moskowitz, 2003). 
 Psychophysics in general, and Weber’s law in particular, can serve as a testable model 
for our first question of interest. Specifically, Weber’s law provides a function predicting how 
perceptions can be extrapolated across different magnitudes of sensory input. Our analogous 
question seeks to develop a function describing how perceptions can be extrapolated across 
different magnitudes of imagined sensory input. Because it seems reasonable that imagining 
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the difference between a 10 and 20 pound object is easier than imagining the difference 
between a 110 and 120 pound object, it is possible that this mental extrapolation of perceptions 
to different magnitudes may also follow Weber’s law.  
 Current trends in psychophysics research do not address this possibility, instead 
applying the concept to enhance product development (Moskowitz, 2003) or in the context of 
visual processing (Murray, 2011). More relevant to our questions concerning human scale is 
the work of Bartoshuk (2004) who seeks to create a scale that equates people’s perceptions 
across subjects. For example, people can understand the statement, “It was a large mouse that 
run up the trunk of a small elephant” (Bartoshuk, 2004, p. 17), but it is only after applying the 
terms within the context of the sentence that people know exactly what “large” and “small” 
mean. Considering this, Bartoshuk raises the question, “Are individual differences in 
experience similar? The ‘Strongest pain experienced’ will obviously denote a more intense 
pain to a woman who has experienced a particularly painful childbirth than to someone whose 
most intense pain to date is a stubbed toe” (2004, p. 17). Likewise, “We can compare very 
weak and very strong rose odors and we can compare very weak and very strong pains, but a 
very strong pain will be much stronger than a very strong rose odor for most individuals” 
(Bartoshuk, 2004, p. 17). More research is needed to understand this variability in perceptions 
based on previous experience and how to best standardize perceptual differences across topics. 
2.2 Numerosity and Numeracy 
An obvious factor underlying differences in perceived magnitude is that of how individuals 
perceive numbers. Numerosity refers to how individuals judge how numerous something is, or 
“how many.” Researchers often employ spatial reasoning tasks, done over very short periods 
of time, involving visual tests of different groupings, arrangements and “connections” of dots 
(Allik & Tuulmets, 1991; Anobile, Turi, & Burr, 2010; Franconeri, Bemis, & Alvarez, 2009; 
Frith & Frith, 1972; Gordon, 2004; He, Zhang, Zhou, & Chen, 2009). For instance, a 
researcher may show two pictures for a split second, each containing varied dot patterns, one 
with lines connecting dots and one without, and then ask which picture contained more dots.  
 Results indicate that people use different cognitive processes in number estimation 
depending on the size of what is to be counted (Anobile et al., 2010; Dehaene & Changeux, 
1993; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). When faced with small numbers of objects, individuals use 
subitizing, which is an automatic and accurate process based on visual recognition, for instance 
noting the difference between two and three coins at a glance. For larger numbers, such as if a 
coin jar spilled, individuals must resort to counting, an effortful and more inaccurate process 
(Anobile et al., 2010; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Results also find that people group objects and 
estimate amounts according to proximity and similarity, but often increase errors with doing so 
(Allik & Tuulmets, 1991; Frith & Frith, 1972; He et al., 2009). For instance, when objects are 
clustered, people tend to underestimate their numbers because clustered objects take up less 
space and appear less numerous. Conversely, when objects are far apart, people tend to 
overestimate their numbers (Franconeri et al., 2009; He et al., 2009).  
 Such number estimating techniques may also be culturally dependent. In America, 
people perceive numbers between 1 and 10 as linear, but logarithmically for larger numbers 
(Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008) whereas an indigenous Amazonian community showed 
logarithmic perceptions across all values. Likewise, Gordon (2004) found the indigenous 
Amazonian community follows a “one, two, many” counting system where the individuals 
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could not accurately represent exact quantities for medium-sized values, such as four or five 
(Gordon, 2004). When asked to perform matching exercises, the individuals successfully 
matched groups 0–3, success dropped to a near 0% for numbers 3–6 and then returned to near 
perfect for groups of 7–10. Gordon (2004) suggests this is perhaps due to chunking, grouping 
into smaller, more manageable, groups of 2–3.  
 Numeracy differs from numerosity in that it refers to the representation of numbers 
rather than amount of objects. One aspect of numeracy involves individual differences of 
mathematical capabilities based on experience or innate ability and suggests that larger 
numbers are often more difficult to understand than smaller numbers. Yet beyond individual 
differences, numeracy also suggests the representation of numbers can influence perceptions 
(Dehaene et al., 2008; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2011; Gigerenzer & Edwards, 2003; Reyna 
& Brainerd, 2008). Identical values presented as a frequency (1 out of 100) versus a probability 
(1%) resulted in different perceptions with the frequency seen as representing greater risk 
(Gigerenzer & Edwards, 2003; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). Likewise, the denominator used to 
present a fraction also influences perceptions. Using smaller denominators that are closer to 
“plausible” group sizes in human society (x / 125) allow easier risk determinations that are less 
influenced by message framing than when the denominator represents a larger value beyond 
normal human group sizes (x / 100,000) (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2011; Wang, 1996).  
 Both numerosity and numeracy suggest that how the mind estimates general amounts 
and comprehends specific number representations can influence changing magnitudes of 
concepts and may play a role in generating perceptions beyond human scale.  
2.3 Grounded Cognition 
Grounded cognition is a field of psychology that claims that functions of the mind are limited 
by biology and heavily influenced by our physical bodies. Unlike traditional theories of 
cognition that assume the mind and body to be separate, grounded cognition can help explain 
why there may be a bias for easier comprehension of concepts at the human scale and more 
difficult comprehension when asked to go beyond—namely that the mind evolved to account 
for sensory input that directly led to bodily survival. Involved in this process are affordances, 
which are relationships between action and perception, or possibilities for interaction (Kaschak 
& Maner, 2009). Simulations of these affordances “allow us to consider, and have our behavior 
controlled by, knowledge and goals that are not directly signaled by the current environment” 
(Kaschak & Maner, 2009, p. 1241). Thus, within the frame of grounded cognition is the belief 
that thoughts are not words or symbols but visual and motor images that are driven by 
everyday goals (Pecher, Boot, & Van Dantzig, 2011).  
 Beyond biological limitations, another aspect of our first question of interest that can 
be addressed through grounded cognition is that of abstraction. Up until this point, we have 
defined concepts beyond human scale as being of a different magnitude. Yet, much of science 
is outside of human scale not because of magnitude, but due to being more intangible or 
abstract than what can be experienced directly. Abstract transfer within grounded cognition can 
serve to explain how people use grounding to understand abstract ideas. For example, telling a 
story is an abstract concept, while handing an object to someone is a concrete action. Yet, 
studies find that both acts of “giving” are represented by a hand movement away from the body 
(Pecher et al., 2011). Abstract concepts with an analogous action are therefore easy to 
“ground” in direct experience. However, concepts that become so abstract that there are no 
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analogous actions in which to ground the experience may result in a categorically different 
challenge to create perceptions beyond human scale. 
2.4 Construal Theory 
Abstraction may not just be specific to the process or phenomenon beyond human scale, but 
also relative to the individual doing the perceiving. Construal theory states that the perception 
of an event is dependent upon the psychological distance between the event and the perceiver 
(Kanten, 2011). Four kinds of psychological distance exist: temporal, spatial, social, and 
probability (Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). In other words, 
decisions and judgments depend on how “close” an event is to an individual. If an event is 
farther away, a person’s construal level is higher, leading to a perception that is more abstract, 
structured and less detailed. In contrast, an event that is closer would cause a person’s 
construal level to be lower and lead to one that is more concrete, unstructured and more 
detailed. Events with a high construal level usually answer the “why” of an event, and low 
construal thoughts answer the “how” (Garcia, 2011).  
 Results show that all four forms of psychological distance can affect people’s 
perceptions of events. For example, temporal distance affects descriptions of life satisfaction. 
People predicted the near future in concrete terms, involving mixed affect, but they predicted 
the distant future more abstractly, with more positive affect (Heller, Stephan, Kifer, & 
Sedikides, 2011). Likewise, even subtle changes in spatial distance can influence the creativity 
in problem solving (Polman & Emich, 2011), and the extremity of affective evaluations is 
larger when abstract and smaller when concrete (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011). Visual and 
verbal representations have also been found to differ in construal levels. Predictably, text 
should require higher construal because it is more abstract, whereas photographs, which are 
concrete representations, should require lower construal. Results support these predictions, 
finding that responses were faster when the medium fit its construal level—photos of domestic 
objects and names of foreign objects (Trope et al., 2007).  
 These results suggest that while the human mind may have physiological limits 
bounded by scale, individual reference points may also play a role in determining what is 
processed within or beyond human scale for an individual at a particular point in time.  
3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
The previous section aimed to summarize literature that could better define the scope of our 
problem, specifically the challenges involved when individuals extrapolate information from 
their direct experience in an attempt to comprehend processes and phenomenon beyond human 
scale. In this section, we begin to suggest areas where a partial solution may be found, 
specifically areas of communication research that may provide experts with a practical toolkit 
to assist non-experts in arriving at a perception more closely aligned with reality. We suggest 
three fields of research that may hold particular promise: metaphor, narrative and visual 
communication. 
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3.1 Metaphor 
Metaphors are linguistic devices that link two concepts together through some shared trait to 
emphasize an aspect of the original concept or make it observable in a new light. The concept 
of metaphor consists of two distinct positions. The first, termed constructivism, views 
metaphor as an intrinsic quality of all language and the process by which humans create new 
knowledge. The second, termed non-constructivism, views metaphor as a literary 
embellishment that allows for a novel interpretation of reality based on emphasizing certain 
features of the paired concepts (Baake, 2003). The second position is more relevant to the 
current study. 
 Science in particular is known for its reliance on metaphor, not just in communication 
with the public, but also between scientists at the research development stage to formulate 
hypotheses and interpret data (Baake, 2003). By linking two concepts, metaphors can offer the 
non-expert public avenues to understand complex scientific phenomenon in terms of 
something more familiar. However, scientific metaphors can also backfire when they blur the 
concept they are trying to clarify or introduce unintended associations, and caution is 
recommended (Weigmann, 2004). 
 Metaphors may help experts communicate beyond human scale by both removing the 
need of potentially confusing values and by substituting something concrete in place of 
something abstract. Returning to our previous example, the 4.9 million barrels of crude oil 
released in the Gulf of Mexico could be described using a metaphor of a newly constructed 
toxic 51st state of the union. Such a metaphor describes the size of the event, associates it 
geographically and emphasizes what about it demands attention, namely the toxic properties, 
without needing to extrapolate specific values of any unit. 
3.2 Narrative 
A narrative, or story, represents a specific and temporally structured form of communication 
where characters and their desires hold a string of events together through a cause and effect 
relationship. Narratives are thought to be processed differently than non-narrative 
communication (Fisher, 1984) and are considered by some to represent the fundamental 
constituents of human cognition (Schank & Abelson, 1995). Supporting this view is research 
that finds narrative communication is read twice as fast and remembered twice as easily as 
non-narrative communication (Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 2002) and can more easily persuade 
otherwise resistant audiences (Moyer-Guse & Nabi, 2010). 
 Processing a narrative essentially involves engaging in a mental simulation of some 
aspect of reality from a particular human point of view (Oatley, 1999). Narratives are therefore 
a method of packaging an event into a particular viewpoint of human scale. Narratives may 
help experts communicate beyond human scale by providing a structure that juxtaposes how 
something beyond human scale looks within human scale.  
 Returning again to our previous example, the 4.9 million barrels of crude oil released 
in the Gulf of Mexico may be better communicated as a story or collection of stories told from 
the viewpoint of individuals nearby or within the event (for example, a narrative of a fisherman 
who has lost his livelihood or a regular vacationer who was shocked to see changes in the 
recreational beach or even a fictional crab struggling to escape the suffocating death of the 
spreading oil). These narratives could portray the magnitude of the event through a mental 
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simulation that provides an even richer and more complex interplay of context without the 
need to extrapolate specific values. 
3.3 Visual Communication 
While communication is often thought of in spoken or written form, visuals represent an 
additional form of communication that may offer benefits through pattern recognition. In 
particular, visual communication has been found to improve comprehension of risks, 
particularly in health contexts (Ancker, Senathirajah, Kukafka, & Starren, 2006; Garcia-
Retamero & Galesic, 2010; Lipkus & Hollands, 1999; Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2008). Different 
forms of visuals are even recommended depending on the type of comprehension desired: 
tables are better at communicating verbatim information whereas pictographs are better when 
the overall gist of the information is more important (Hawley et al., 2008). 
 However, it is important to avoid “hiding” pieces of information when constructing 
visuals for the communication of risk. Important information can be lost due to the 
foreground/background salience effect that states that in graphical situations, people are drawn 
to foreground information and pay less attention to what is in the background. This can skew 
the risk perception and lead people to incorrect perceptions, especially when the number of 
people at risk is emphasized at the expense of all those at risk of harm (Stone et al., 2003). 
 Again returning to our example, rather than attempt to portray the magnitude of 4.9 
million barrels of crude oil in words, a visual comparing the volume of oil released in the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the amount of oil used daily in the U.S. and the amount of oil 
necessary to cause damage to certain types of ecosystems could assist in constructing a 
perception of the magnitude of the event that may align more closely with reality, again 
without the need to extrapolate values beyond human scale. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of communicating beyond human scale is an understudied problem within 
science communication of which experts are often expected to be able to address. The 
successful communication of these processes and phenomenon outside of human scale is 
crucial for informed decision making within a democratic society, yet most experts are not 
equipped to address these challenges and unfortunately very little theoretical work exists to 
assist them. 
 Therefore, the purpose of this article was not to propose a solution but to better define 
the scope of the problem by summarizing literature than begins to explore the challenges of 
communicating beyond human scale and identifying areas of communication literature where a 
partial solution might be found.  
 Specifically, we suggest that the field of psychophysics offers a testable model in 
Weber’s law to examine how perceptions are extrapolated across different magnitudes of 
imagined sensory input. Likewise the areas of numerosity, numeracy, grounded cognition and 
construal theory offer theories and empirical evidence that suggest perceiving concepts beyond 
human scale becomes increasingly difficult and likely divorced from reality. We also suggest 
that the areas of metaphor, narrative and visual communication represent promising areas of 
communication research that may offer practical methods for experts to better address these 
challenge when communicating to non-experts. Specifically, metaphor addresses the bias of 
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magnitudes and abstractness, narrative represents a structure that packages abstract concepts 
into human scale and visual communication can leverage the comprehension benefits of pattern 
recognition over language-based description. 
 With the problem defined and relevant literature identified and summarized, this 
article represents a call for future research to explore these areas to better understand the 
boundaries of human cognition on an axis of scale, the processing strategies used to address 
these boundaries, the inaccuracies or biases inherent in these processing strategies and finally 
how experts can use communication to help correct for these biases. An additional question not 
addressed in this paper is that even when the answers to these questions are better understood, 
it is likely that experts will not be adequately trained in using the successful communication 
techniques. Therefore, additional research needs to examine the organizational structures that 
may best equip and reward experts for their ability to assist non-experts in the construction of 
more accurate perceptions beyond human scale. 
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